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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A SURVEY ON FOREIGN INVESTORS’ PERCEPTION OF KOREA’S 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND HOW THIS INFLUENCES THEIR 
COMPANIES’ PLANNING AND RE-INVESTMENT DECISIONS 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Luis Riestra 
 
 
 
Although Korea seems to be making efforts to deregulate 
the FDI environment, many obstacles remain for investors. 
The current business environment as it applies to foreign 
companies creates frustrations and impediment to further 
expansion. In a quest for understanding how both the 
investment and continuous business environment affect the 
decision-making process of foreign entities established 
in Korea, the survey looks at several aspects of 
operating a business, also including a few parameters on 
lifestyle in general. It is hypothesized that these 
measures of business environment are determinant on 
organizational planning and whether more investment is to 
be dedicated to Korea. With strong emerging economies 
such as neighboring China and not so distant India, 
foreign investors’ alternatives are increasingly better 
and hence Korea’s environment if left unattended will 
become this economy’s worst FDI inducement enemy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Korea might be losing competitive edge in FDI inducement 
at a critical fast pace, risking being completely 
engulfed by giants such as China and India in a mere 
matter of years.  
 
The Korean government is indeed making efforts and 
dedicating capital, human, material and land resources to 
the cause, nevertheless investment inducement and 
profitability are not just about what country offers more 
for less, competition in neighboring economies makes it 
clear that outsmarting other’s strategies is a vital part 
of the process, and that attracting foreign capital and 
using it domestically are part of the skills the 
government must implement to play the game successfully.  
 
Despite efforts and resources, Korea is remarkably under-
invested with foreign capital, standing far below its 
current OECD-ranked potential. Being in the top 5% 
economies in the world, and embedded right within 
voracious FDI inducers, Korea’s privileged position 
stands on shaky ground,  and there is no question that its 
place in the global arena will be fiercely disputed by 
others. 
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The country seems to have adapted well to its domestic 
market trends for the past several decades, yet not so 
much at the global level. This claim makes the current 
situation more interesting, given that perhaps more than 
ever before strong economies around the world have set 
the new standards of globalization and economies that 
don’t adapt and strive within the new parameters of 
unified regional or global economies will bare the 
consequences of incompetence.  
   
It is worth then questioning why the Korean government 
makes such desperate attempts at inducing FDI. Such 
unfocused strategies as that of being the “Hub” of every 
industry, allocating massive budget to provincial and 
local investment offices, and other such expending sprees 
are all undermining essential conditions for prosperous 
global economies.  
 
This thesis targets factors in Korea’s business 
environment that are as important and play as heavy of a 
role in investment decisions as incentives and industry-
specific benefits. Among these factors, how foreigners 
experience banking, the availability of leisure 
activities for expatriates and the corporate environment 
in general are all as important in deciding to invest 
more capital in Korea.  
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1. AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS ON THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT 
 
Korea’s FDI strategy overuses statements of so-called 
“advantages” that don’t seem meaningful, perhaps of 
concern to some investors but that indeed show a good 
degree of irrelevance to the cause, and some of it even 
appears to be self-defeating in purpose.  
 
I gathered some of these tag lines and put them together 
in the following table, detailing how they diverge from 
the core of meaningful investment inducement strategy: 
KOREA’S FDI PROMOTION TAGLINES AND THEIR WEAKNESSES
44 cities of population 
1 million + within 4 
hours flight
Right in between 
giant economies 
China and Japan
More diligent workforce 
than Japan US, UK, 
Germany in annual 
number of work hours
Including cities in North Korea, Russia, 
China, Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, Hong Kong, all of different 
economies and purchasing power and various 
degrees of accessibility. Irrelevant to 
market-focused and customer-targeted enterprises. 
The argument is self-defeating if one considers 
that nearby cities in other countries posses
the same advantage!
A geographical advantage? If what the investor is
looking for is location advantage, then giant neighbors
might sound just as or even more enticing sites for FDI
These countries have much larger GDP per capita, 
all this indicates is that Koreans work much more
to achieve less production! This is a pure highlight
of work inefficiency as compared to those countries
 
Graph 1: FDI promotion tag lines 
 
 
삭제됨: so called
삭제됨: more intrinsic 
than 
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Putting these into perspective, the following 
explanations offer more detail: 
 
1.1 44 cities of population 1 million within 4 hours 
flight 
 
I pointed out on this picture the cities that make the 
promotion tag line not meaningful as a differentiation 
strategy.              
 
44 cities with populations of over 1 
million within a 4 hours flight
Geographical Advantage? Over neighboring 
cities?
 
Graph 2: FDI promotion tag lines; large cities 
By way of comparison, JETRO (Japan External Trade 
Organization) through its IPA “Invest Japan”, promotes 
geographical location and flight time to nearby highly 
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populated cities in the same way Korea does. Incheon Free 
Economic Zone Cheongna area advertises the “geographical 
superiority” of Korea due to its air and sea access. A 
tag line that fails to recognize that any other major 
city of neighboring countries Japan and China would also 
be able to offer. 
  
1.2 Located between strong economies China and Japan 
 
With China’s FDI deregulation, abundant labor at low cost 
and Japan’s both technological state and market size and 
purchasing power being superior to that of Korea, it is 
arguable that an investor looking for the best place to 
set up and operate a business and to position its output 
to a population with a high purchasing power might not 
see Korea as good of a site compared to China with Korea 
and Japan as target markets.  
 
Moreover, isolated by land, Korea forces shipping of 
goods through high-risk and slow sea or expensive air 
cargo, eliminating the convenience and low cost land 
alternatives such as truck and train.  
 
1.3 More diligent work force than Japan, US, UK and 
Germany cited often as examples.  
 
삭제됨:  
삭제됨: fleeting 
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The following table shows a comparison of the number of 
work hours advertised by Korea’s FDI promotion force and 
other numbers not commonly shown, but that explain that 
this measure is not an advantage to Korea: 
 
 A COMPARISON OF DILIGENCY VS PRODUCTION BETWEEN KOREA
AND SOME COMMONLY CITED COUNTRIES IN FDI PROMOTION
COUNTRY TOTAL GDP
1 POPULATION GDP PER CAPITA
2 Average number of Work hours
(in billions) (in millions) (per year) 
3
Japan US$4,623 127 US$30,700.00 1801
US US$11,667 298 US$42,000.00 1792
UK US$2,140 60 US$30,900.00 1673
Germany US$2,714 82 US$29,800.00 1446
Korea US$679 48 US$20,400.00 2390
1 = World Bank List, 2004
2 = World Fact Book, 2004
3= OECD Fact book, 2005
 
Table A: Diligence Vs. Productivity 
This graph shows productivity as measured by GDP per 
capita and the average number of hours per year worked in 
these 5 strong economies. Note that the smaller the gap 
between the two “towers” of productivity and diligence 
indicate inefficiency to some extent (the case of Korea), 
and the taller the productivity tower and the shorter its 
associated diligence tower, the less people work to 
achieve the most (the case of USA).  
삭제됨: complete the 
story by telling 
삭제됨: us 
삭제됨: In t
삭제됨: we 
삭제됨: see comparison 
between
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Graph 3: Diligence Vs. Productivity Gap 
 
The numbers shown above express that the tag line of a 
“diligent work force” is either not a proper reflection 
of the truth or the fact is not being communicated 
properly.  
 
This poor approach actually weakens Korea’s quest for 
investment. Promotion organizations must search and find 
Korea’s true strengths as they apply to potential foreign 
investors, and must be very careful in framing their 
claims more accurately than the above. 
서식 있음: 표준, 왼쪽, 줄
간격: 1.5줄
삭제됨: 
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2. WHERE ARE KOREA’S TRUE ADVANTAGES? 
 
Investment promotion agencies of Korea have focused their 
country-branding efforts on outlining what they see as 
Korea’s competitive strengths against other neighboring 
countries and potential alternatives for FDI, but not 
necessarily has the activity been centered on what makes 
Korea profitable and a good place for business, which is 
in principle what investors look for at first.  
 
Examples on this point are as follows: 
 
1. Korea uses FDI incentives (cash grants, low taxes, 
free land, etc) to lure MNEs. These incentives 
although cost reducing at first, in themselves do 
not guarantee a company profitability, nor do they 
ease market penetration and product/service 
receptiveness. 
2. The government promotes the future existence of 
foreign schools and hospitals, yet there are still 
a good number of regulations, considerations on the 
profitability of these organizations and social 
rejection of such projects. Social beliefs about 
schools and hospitals being “for-the-people” type 
of organizations that should operate on a non-
profit basis further aggravate the task.  
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게 없음
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게 없음
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게 없음
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게 없음
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게 없음
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게 없음
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게 없음
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게 없음
삭제됨: Here I quote 
newly appointed head of 
Invest Korea, the 
nation’s official IPA 
Dr. Tong Soo Chung, on 
the topic of human 
resources competency, 
in his speech delivered 
at the Korea 
Development Institute 
School on April 15th, 
2006 as saying “…how do 
we assume we are 
smarter than say 
Indians or Chinese or 
Japanese, or more 
academically prepared? 
India has 300 million 
university grads, the 
great majority of whom 
speak much better 
English than many in 
Korea, as long as we 
keep assuming we are a 
better prepared force 
삭제됨: , both these 
groups of 
삭제됨: (international) 
삭제됨:  in certain zones
삭제됨: aggravate
삭제됨: FDI inducement 
... [2]
... [1]
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3. The “hub” of everything unfocused strategy 
increases the problem of domestic FDI inducement 
competition, which only exacerbates the lavish 
expenditure on promotion pushing local IPAs to give 
away benefits in excess of the calculable benefits 
the FDI enterprise provides to its host. 
4. A good number of FDI inducement winning countries 
that have emerged in the 1990s shed light on what 
Korea could strategize to position itself as an FDI 
winner. India is an example where a culture-wide 
change in receptiveness is growing the country 
beyond expectations.  
 
 China a good example of consistent de-regulation 
 efforts paying off with significant FDI attention.  
 Ireland’s a stunning example on how to use private-
 sector marketing skills and using profitability 
 schemes to attract investment that have turned 
 one of Europe’s  farm land into a strong, fastest EU 
 growing economy. Costa Rica follows closely  with 
 this model.  
 
Korea’s strengths lie not on what its authorities want to 
portray or become, these are aspirations and not properly 
used measures and tools of promotion for what Korea is 
today.  
서식 있음: 글머리 기호 및
번호 매기기
서식 있음: 들여쓰기: 왼쪽: 
0.71 cm
서식 있음
삭제됨: furthers 
삭제됨:  
삭제됨: 
삭제됨: <#>More on the 
hub idea, despite the 
budget dedicated to 
this and efforts 
targeting FDI 
inducement, the only 
hub that has emerged 
strong is the one of 
inconsistency. With an 
overwhelming plethora 
of laws, rules, 
regulations, and 
implicit barriers to 
FDI,  Korea wastes tons 
of resources on 
promoting impossible to 
achieve endeavors. 
Internal 
inconsistencies make 
삭제됨: and early 
millennium s
삭제됨: n
삭제됨: magnet
삭제됨: excellent 
삭제됨: mentality and 
삭제됨: . 
삭제됨: s c
삭제됨: behind in this 
part-state part-private 
... [4]
... [3]
... [5]
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The realistic picture of Korea is one that shows its 
economic position in the world, its domestic market 
purchasing power, its strong industries such as car and 
ship making, semiconductors and internet.  
 
An unmatched ability to recover from financial slow down 
(a great risk-management strength for potential 
investors), its consumer confidence and brand 
consciousness, its telecommunications leadership, modern 
infrastructure (transportation, communication, building), 
ability to host world class events successfully and 
safely and an unparalleled ability to build any size of 
infrastructure project in seemingly impossible time 
frames. 
  
The evidence is conclusive in that Korean authorities 
must take a more accurate approach at branding the 
country for foreign investment and need to search for and 
exploit the keys strengths that make Korea a profitable 
country to invest in. 
 
 
 
 
 
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게
서식 있음: 글꼴: 굵게
삭제됨: Perhaps a more
삭제됨: its 
삭제됨: its 
삭제됨: (World Cup 2002, 
APEC, Asian Games, WCEC, 
Olympics, World Expos), 
its
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3. CHRONOLOGY OF FDI PROMOTION EVENTS IN KOREA 
 
Korea must implement a plan that envisions how much FDI 
it will need for FDI itself to contribute its rightful 
portion to the government’s $20,000 GDP goal, in a 
reasonable time, and break it down to its essential and 
indivisible components such as the tasks each individual 
involved in investment promotion must perform.  
 
A major task remains, that of identifying dozens of 
companies that could benefit from setting up in Korea, 
identifying the best entry mode, then approaching these 
firms with a concrete and relevant description on how 
Korea is an attractive market for them, how much 
investment is needed to make the market entry the best, 
where in the country they would best fit to outsource 
their products and help Korea’s regional development.  
 
Instead, government agencies that deal with FDI promotion 
will work backwards to this model and seek to understand 
Korea’s development needs, assign a geographical location 
to these needs, dedicate significant capital and “create” 
a new zone, stuff offices with printed materials to lure 
investors by proposing many profit-irrelevant 
characteristics of their sites. 
 
삭제됨: FDI 
삭제됨: has 
삭제됨: to
삭제됨: and profit 
삭제됨: all 
삭제됨: plan 
삭제됨: as to
삭제됨: they need to 
삭제됨:  plans
삭제됨: money 
삭제됨: push its people 
there to conceive
삭제됨: aids 
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Where is the problem? A highly regulated environment that 
slows down the process, unclear “big-picture” goals, a 
very poor investor-targeting, a very low “land-the-deal” 
ratio and investors complains pouring from all corners. 
 
Zones fiercely competing giving away limited resources, 
unbalanced regional development and job creation, and all 
of these with the un-coordinated contribution of other 
sectors of the government whose agendas are too busy to 
fit the “big-picture” goal.  
 
Example of this is FSS and NTS and their ability to 
regulate the foreign financial sector investors, Ministry 
of Justice with remarkable visa benefits for investor and 
yet making it impossible to process visas to hire foreign 
employees, Ministry of Commerce giving away tax benefits 
and NTS (National Tax Service) chasing large MNEs in 
public for un-paid taxes.  
 
Parallel to that, Free Economic Zones breaking ground to 
build foreign hospitals and schools and labor unions 
opposing the move, Ministry of Commerce pouring money 
into training people to understand the mechanisms of FDI 
inducement and handling but using its human resources 
according to the traditional hierarchical model that 
disregards academic background and relevant experience. 
삭제됨: tons of 
삭제됨: for 
삭제됨: old
삭제됨: ,
삭제됨: , etc, etc, etc 
the list goes on long
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The following list itemizes news, as these appeared in 
local and regional publications during the second half of 
2005 and early 2006. The reader might identify progress 
as well as contradiction throughout the period indicated 
in this section.  
Table B: FDI News 
  
  
  
THE 2005-2006 FDI NEWS CALENDAR 
WHAT WAS SAID & WHO SAID IT 
  
  
  
  
DATE WHAT WHO 
      
18-May Overseas publicity tour by Kosdaq and KOSPI  Korea Exchange 
  reaps FDI and prompts higher share prices   
      
01-Jun Korean Wave pulls in currency, but more out- Central bank 
  bound FDI in same industry   
      
09-Jun Foreign workers in local financial firms to be  Ministry of Justice 
  allowed to stay up to 3 years without visa   
      
13-Jun Seoul invites Chinese top CEOs to conference Seoul City 
  to promote Chinese FDI into Korea and networks   
      
16-Jun Foreign Investors investing $500,000 and over to  Ministry of Justice 
  get immigration benefits such as 3-5 years visas   
  and resident status.   
      
17-Jun FEZs to be eased to attract FDI, measures  Ministry of Finance 
  include allowing domestic conglomerates to set up   
  high-tech factories to attract partnerships   
      
17-Jun Aim at shifting from competition to cooperation with Ministry of Maritime 
삭제됨: 
I have prepared t
삭제됨: of 
삭제됨: y
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  Japan and China proposed by Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
  Affairs and Fisheries for logistics-hub idea   
      
20-Jun Foreign Investors increase share holding to gain Korea Exchange 
  management powers at local firms, prompt local   
  local shareholders to do same   
      
29-Jun Immigration to increase the number of years of visa   
  for foreign investors, extend benefits for investors'  
  spouses, allow them to work as professors    
      
20-Jul Philadelphia International Medicine to build hospital Ministry of Finance 
  in Incheon FEZ Songdo City by 2008, will bring   
  advanced technology to treat Korean patients   
      
08-Jul Busan-Jinhae FEZ attracts US $70 million from US Busan City 
  steel parts maker and aerospace industry firm   
      
20-Jul Korea to form task force on investment promotion Ministry of Commerce 
  central and local governments to join hand in job Industry and Energy 
      
04-Aug Foreigner's land ownership continues to rise Ministry of  
  constituting nearly 0.2% of total national land. Construction 
      
08-Aug Foreign companies to be encouraged to join NTS 
  Korean bourse.    
      
09-Aug Foreign Financial Institutions allowed to set up FSS 
  financial holding firms by early 2006   
      
15-Aug Tax authorities to strengthen investigations on  NTS 
  foreign firms as of next month   
      
15-Aug 50% of foreign investors in Korea view FEZs as  Korea Herald 
  uninteresting and uncertain, 30% view them as    
  unsuccessful and 10% as good. Survey.   
      
15-Aug FEZs fail to outperform competitors Foreign Investors 
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29-Aug Actions taken by prosecution against Hermes  Hermes Investment 
  Investment Management will trigger re-evaluation of Management 
  its presence in Korea, will be closely watched by   
  investors around the world.   
      
30-Aug FEZs expected to play an important role, supported US Embassy 
  by US Embassy   
      
01-Sep Adopting a more global view of innovation is Schwarz Pharma 
  necessary to attract FDI in pharmaceuticals   
      
07-Sep Foreign investors increase profits through stocks Bank of Korea 
      
15-Sep Koreas outbound FDI outpaces inbound Government 
      
23-Sep Foreign investment falls during first half of year Ministry of Commerce 
      
26-Sep BJFEZ expending high on luring US Investors BJFEZ 
      
06-Oct FDI declines 9.4% in 3rd quarter due to oil prices Government 
  strong won. R & D FDI rose in same period   
      
14-Oct FDI helps raise corporate competency, FDI has  Government Report 
  good impact on the domestic industry    
      
19-Oct Foreign investors disturbed by inconsistent policies Korea Herald 
  red tape, slow progress at FEZs.   
      
26-Oct Seoul lags far behind international capitals in    
  corporate competitiveness, commercial infrastructure Arthur D. Little 
  and environmental attractiveness   
      
28-Oct Korea lacks institutional efficiency hence it can't World Economic Forum 
  make it to top 10 world economies   
      
02-Nov new Songdo City appoints operator of international New Songdo City 
  school under Harvard Advisory Group consulting   
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07-Nov Authorities have the notion that by making  Park Law Offices 
  overseas remittance more inconvenient they can    
  actually promote FDI   
      
09-Nov Foreign land ownership valued at W24.7 trillion Ministry of  
    Construction 
      
11-Nov Korea needs more realistic hub plans, these are  Korean Shippers 
  more talk than action, inefficient operations and Council 
  labor issues at heart of problem.   
      
11-Nov Jeju plans to build foreign hospitals put off  Ministry of Home Affairs 
  indefinitely due to opposition from civil and    
  medical opposition   
      
14-Nov Major FDI firms set up base in North Jeolla North Jeolla 
    Government 
15-Nov Korea determined to create NE Asia financial hub Korea Center for 
    International Finance 
      
21-Nov Prologis sees future in Korea's Free Economic Prologis 
  Zones, invests $200 M into IFEZ   
      
22-Nov Foreign investors prefer shares of financial companies Korea Exchange 
  buy $635b in 2005   
      
24-Nov Korea to allow overseas financial firms to merge Ministry of Finance 
  units   
      
26-Nov Low FDI and high salaries weight heavily on  Deputy Finance  
  Korea's $20,000 GDP per capita goal Minister 
      
28-Nov Listed companies with high foreign shareholdings Korea Herald 
  show higher profits and less debt   
      
01-Dec Foreign investors fee payments into the Korea's Central Bank 
  financial markets soars as more shares bought   
 25 
      
05-Dec Korean aiming at attracting 41 foreign R & D  Ministry of Science  
  centers in 2006 Technology 
      
07-Dec 10 more regions selected as special zones to  Ministry of Finance 
  bring total to 41   
      
08-Dec Seoul introduces panel of 30 private and public  Ministry of Finance 
  sector officials to make decisions on financial hub plans   
09-Dec Foreign capital produces mixed impact on Korea, Federation of Banks 
  making even local banks risk-averse hence    
  neglecting the corporate sector, but introduce    
  sophisticated financial services.   
      
24-Dec Seoul to offer integrated administrative assistance Ministry of Commerce 
  online service to help foreign investors by Aug.2006   
      
03-Jan Tax investigations into foreign companies ought  Finance Minister 
  be conducted more carefully and with class   
      
05-Jan FDI falls 9.6% in 2005 Ministry of Commerce 
    Industry and Energy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
삭제됨: 
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4. A SURVEY ON KOREA’S BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND ITS 
EFFECT ON FOREIGN INVESTORS PLANNING AND REINVESTMENT 
DECISIONS 
 
This survey was designed to contain 33 multiple-choice 
questions, including demographics. To this date, the 
survey remains open online at  
http://www.hostedsurvey.com/takesurvey.asp?c=FDI 
 
At the time I tallied responses, 31 entities had 
responded, including some of Fortune 500 MNE’s, medium 
and small sized enterprises as well, all headed by 
foreigners and set up with foreign capital.  
 
My one-directional hypothesis was as follows: 
 
 “I  hypot hesi ze t hat  i f  t he busi ness and soci al  
envi r onment  of  Kor ea ar e per cei ved t o be di f f i cul t  t o 
cope wi t h,  i nvest or s wi l l  be r el uct ant  t o r e- i nvest and 
expand oper at i ons i n Kor ea”.  
 
My independent variable was set to be the positive or 
negative decision on reinvestment and expansion planning, 
for which I devised a section of the survey and placed it 
at the beginning together with demographic information 
questions. The purpose was to ask straightforward, clear 
and concise questions on the possibility of re-investment 
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and planning.  
 
In this way, the respondent would have to answer with 
definite entries about his/her plans to reinvest and 
expand, thus making this whole section the independent 
variable. This section was placed first on the online 
survey and was blocked for participants not to be able to 
return to it to change any answers at a later stage after 
having responded to the dependent variables.  
 
I had to utilize several concepts in order to ask 
investors on several aspects of investing and doing 
business in Korea, hence I devised a series of 4 measures 
to test my hypothesis; Banking, FDI incentives and 
regulations; business environment; and lifestyle for 
foreigners.  
 
Each concept I am using, which becomes a measure in 
itself, is more concretely defined as: 
 
1. Banking: How difficult it is to do personal banking, 
transfer personal funds abroad, transfer large 
corporate earnings, how competitive are banking 
systems compared to those of other countries, how 
well do banks in Korea cater to foreign customers 
and how difficult it’s to obtain credit cards and 
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loans. 
2. FDI incentives and regulations: FDI incentives 
collected by the company, regulations concerning 
type of investment, origin of funds and 
repatriation of earnings/goods, and a comparison of 
Korea’s FDI environment to similar world economies. 
3. Business environment: Cost of doing business, 
profitability in the domestic market and managing 
Korea staff. 
4. Lifestyle for foreigners: communicating with 
Koreans, Korea’s leisure industry as it caters to 
foreigners, and dealing with daily hazards such as 
pollution, transportation, work, cost of living and 
traffic. 
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5. SURVEY RESULTS 
 
Not all questions and answers are exposed here since some 
of these were of sensitive nature, such as personal name 
and whether the company planed to hire more personnel as 
some respondents expressed their concerns over this 
information being public. However, all other questions on 
demographics and on Korea’s business environment yielded 
the following results: 
 
5.1 Demographics 
 
1. 3 female respondents, 27 males and one nil answer 
 
2. 9 respondents were between the ages of 31 and 40, 
12 between 41 and 50, 7 between 51 and 60 and the 
remaining 3 were above 60. 
 
3. 5 respondents have been in Korea less than a year, 
9 have been in Korea between 1 and 3 years, 3 
between 3 and 5 years, 6 between 5 and 10 years, 4 
between 10 and 20 years and the remaining 4 more 
than 20 years. 
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Graph 4: Respondents’ Sojourn in Korea 
The reason for asking this question is to determine if 
the opinion makers have been in Korea long enough to 
formulate insights based on experiences more so than 
stereotypes. 
 
4. 4 respondents asserted that they would leave Korea 
within this year 2006,  13 that they would live 
within 3 years, 2 would leave Korea within 5 years, 
8 don’t have a date for leaving planned as of yet, 
3 might never leave Korea according to their 
answers and 1 abstained from answering this 
question. 
 
5. Respondents that participated were from the 
following countries (note that more than one respondent 
can be from a country already mentioned): 
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Australia Denmark Belgium Switzerland 
China Norway Philippines Venezuela 
UK USA France 
Table c: Respondents Countries 
6. A total of 6 companies declined to identify 
themselves, the remaining contributors are listed 
below: 
 
Look 
Media 
Coca-Cola 
Bottling 
Autoliv 
Mando 
Agfa Sandvik 
Norske 
Skog 
Zuellig 
Pharma 
Local 
Bank 
Regus Fulbright 
HSBC KABC Dole Salvation Army 
Miya Power 
Company 
ASCOTT 
Writer’s 
Ink 
BMW 
Magnachip 
Semiconductor 
Modine 
3M Coresight JTI 
British American 
Tobacco 
Foreign 
University 
Table D: Respondents’ Companies 
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7. Initial investment was categorized as shown in the 
graph below: 
Graph 5: Initial Investment 
8. When asked on the size of their company, 4 
respondents indicated that their company remains at 
about $50,000 of paid-in capital and/or assets, 3 
between $50,000 and $300,000, 7 between $300,000 
and $5 million, the remaining 17 answered that 
their firms were valued at more than $10 million. 
It is worth noting that the initial investment and 
company size categories were designed to be the 
same, and the amounts are in accordance to what the 
Korean government considers to be the minimum 
investment to form an FDI company ($50,000), the 
minimum investment to obtain a 2 years + visa 
($300,000), the minimum investment required to be 
eligible for cash grants as FDI incentives for 
certain types of industries ($5 million), and the 
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minimum required for a company to have access to 
free land and tax cuts ($10 million). 
 
9. Also questioned on their size of operations, 1 
person answer to be his/her own and only employee, 
4 answered they had less than 10 people in their 
team, 10 between 10 and 100 employees, 11 between 
100 and 999 employees, and the remaining 5 employ 
more than 1000 people. In here the size has been 
categorized to reflect the internationally agree 
standard of a small company (less than 100 
employees), medium sized (between 100 and 999) and 
large size (above 1000), with less than 10 being a 
very small operation. 
 
Company Size in # of Employees
Single
owner
3%
Very Small
Firms
13%
Small Firms
32%
Medium
Firms
36%
Large Firms
16% Single owner
Very  Small Firms
Small Firms
Medium Firms
Large Firms
 
Graph 6: Company Size in # of Employees 
10.  When asked on whether their firms had ever 
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invested again into Korea, 1 participant decided to 
leave this as confidential information, 6 indicated 
that it hadn’t been done, and the remaining 24 said 
that it had been done. 
 
Number of Companies That Have Reinvested
No info
3% No19%
Yes
78%
No info
No  
Yes
 
Graph 7: Reinvesting Companies 
11. Reinvestment was done in different sizes, with 1 
respondent indicating this reinvestment was sized 
less than $50,000, 2 indicating between $50,000 and 
$300,000, 4 indicating between $300,000 and 
$5million, 3 indicating between $5 million and $10 
million, 10 asserted that the size of investment 
was $10 million or above, and the remaining 10 
indicated that either they didn’t know or the 
amount was confidential. This category also 
comprises those who answered “no” to the previous 
question on whether their firms had reinvested 
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again. 
 
12. When asked whether their organization had plans to 
invest in Korea, 5 respondents indicate that it was 
not the case, 2 kept the information as 
confidential, 6 were not sure of their companies 
intentions in this respect and the remaining 18 
answered positively.  
 
Companies Planning to Reinvest
59%
6%
9%
6% No
Confidential
Don't Know
Yes
 
Graph 8: Planning to Reinvest 
13. 7 of the firms surveyed were not planning to hire any 
more personnel to expand operations, 3 wouldn’t share 
this information and the remaining 21 said they planned 
hire more people.  
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Companies Planning to Hire more Personnel
23%
10%
67%
No
No Info
Yes
 
Graph 9: Planning to Hire 
13. Among those who answered the survey on behalf of 
their firms, 6 asserted to have little or no 
influence on a possible reinvestment decision, 1 
mentioned being the only one to decide and  all 
other 24 admitted to be one of the decision makers 
in the process. 
 
14. Nevertheless, the following question was designed 
to understand the point of view of the respondent 
him/herself and how they would act if given the 
opportunities to be the sole decision makers on 
reinvesting in Korea. The purpose of this question 
was to understand more in-depth what was the 
variation on personal experience vs. corporate 
approach to this aspect. 10 respondents were not 
sure whether they would make such move, 3 were 
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definitely sure they wouldn’t invest while the 
remaining 18 were positive about wanting to 
reinvest in Korea. 
 
I Would Reinvest if it Were up to Me Only
10%
32%58%
No
Not Sure
Yes
 
Graph 10: Willingness to Reinvest 
5.2 Banking in Korea 
 
15. When asked how do they rate their experience in the 
aspect of personal banking, including withdrawals/ 
deposits through ATMs and tellers, paying bills or 
making inquiries, a rating scale was made with the 
highest score of 5 indicating a very positive 
experience and a lowest score of 1 to indicate a 
very negative experience, leaving 3 as a neutral 
answer meaning that little or no direct involvement 
was found in such activity by the respondent. 
Following questions use the same rating scale in 
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order to tally high scores as positive views and 
low scores as negatives views. Entries of “0” 
indicate a respondent left this question unanswered. 
The results for this question are shown below: 
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Graph 11: Personal Banking 
There was a tendency of respondents to answer low to 
medium in this question. This might suggest that 
perhaps use of ATMs and communication barriers with 
tellers make the banking experience slower and more 
inefficient than at other countries. Also, this points 
at some percentage of the population not using the 
ATMs and tellers very often or making basic 
transactions thus rendering the service somewhat 
irrelevant. 
 
16. The following question inquired on the ease at 
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which individuals could repatriate funds for 
personal reasons. It asked to consider the process 
taking into consideration time to make transaction, 
document requirements, regulations, cost, etc. The 
graph below explains the results: 
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Graph 12: Remittance of Personal Funds 
Again, the tendency seems to point at discontent with 
this aspect of banking, with an average response lower 
than the neutral 3. This low ranking might be due to 
regulations limiting the amount a foreigner can remit 
per year as an individual without requiring 
complicated procedures and documents. Perhaps 
communication barriers play a role in here as well. 
 
17. In this question, respondents were being asked to 
rate their opinion on the process of repatriating 
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large funds as corporate earnings. They were more 
specifically asked to consider taxation issues, 
document requirements and regulations imposed. 
Results are as follows: 
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Graph 13: Remittance of Corporate Funds 
With a low mean of 2.42, we are again faced with the 
idea that respondents either do not see this process 
as a reasonable and some are actually not involved 
much with it. It seems though that there are enough 
respondents towards the positive side to more or 
less balance the answers, suggesting perhaps that 
respondents are not necessarily involved in the 
process and are not fully aware whether it is 
difficult or not. 
 
18. This question shows a stronger negative tendency 
than the previous ones. In here I asked respondents 
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to rate Korea’s bank systems and overall perception 
of banks here to that of banks in other countries, 
by means of using regulations, quality of service, 
expertise of personnel, variety of services and the 
likes. Results shown below; 
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Graph 14: Domestic Vs. Overseas Banks 
The much more clear tendency here suggests that 
according to our foreign investor respondents, banks 
in Korea do not seem as competitive as those of other 
countries, although a few people seem to be pleased 
with them. There could be a country-specific variance 
here, which we are not able to determine just by 
looking at the results.  
 
19. In this question, I asked respondents to rate 
Korea’s banks services in what concerns the ability 
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to cater to the foreign community in a language 
other than Korean. 
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Graph 15: Domestic Banks, Foreign Languages 
We can clearly see again a tendency to answer negative, 
with fewer respondents considering the issue not 
important or positively.  
 
This might point at the fact that historically local 
banks have not made spoken English or other foreign 
languages oral proficiency a pre-requisite for employment 
at the interface with customers.  
 
Although it is becoming apparent that banks are hiring 
personnel who can cater to foreigners in international 
languages (Korea Exchange Bank credit card center, 
Chohung-Shinghan credit card center, departments such as 
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commercial banking staffed with foreigners at HSBC, 
Standard Chartered and Citigroup), there is still a gap 
between what local banks can offer and perhaps what our 
respondents would see as a service catering to the 
foreign community.  
 
20. In the last question concerning banking, we ask 
respondents to rate their experience in terms of 
getting credit cards and loan approval, including 
business loans and mortgages. This question aims at 
understanding how difficult it is for non-citizens 
of Korea to process such credits. 
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Graph 16: Credits and Loans 
In here we see that answers are a somewhat gathered 
again on the lower part of the spectrum, suggesting 
that it might be difficult or nearly impossible to 
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process credits for foreigners or that it may be the 
case many do not try either.  
 
5.3 Foreign Investment Incentives and Regulations 
 
21. In This section, we start by asking respondents to 
detail what kind of benefits they might have 
received when investing in Korea. 8 respondents 
were not sure if any such incentives had been 
granted to their firm upon entry to Korea, 16 
respondents did not get any incentives, 3 did not 
share this information and the remaining 4 were 
given tax exemptions and reductions. 
 
22. Now I turned to FDI regulations to ask respondents 
what they think of FDI requirements, sectors 
allowed and not allowed for FDI, disclosure of 
information rules and capital repatriation 
regulations. Responses were as follows: 
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Graph 17: FDI Regulations 
Answers suggest a strong tendency to disregard this 
subject as not relevant. It may be that, comparing 
this answer to that of question numbered 13 above, the 
respondents do not view this aspect as important as 
they are not the sole decision makers in the 
investment process.  
 
Perhaps added to this is the fact that such 
regulations are usually detrimental to the FDI process. 
Moreover, by definition all respondents are successful 
FDI investors into Korea, since they are responding to 
this survey as companies already established here. 
 
23. In this question, I asked respondents to rate their 
overall perception of the FDI environment of Korea 
as compared to that of other similar economies. The 
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following came up: 
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Graph 18: Domestic Vs. Foreign FDI Environment 
Many responses here allocated to between poor and 
neutral may suggest that Korea’s FDI environment is 
slightly lagging behind similar economies thriving for 
FDI. It may also reflect lack of FDI experience in 
other countries by the respondent. 
 
5.4 Business Environment 
 
24. To begin this new section, I ask participants to 
rate their perception of the cost of doing business 
in Korea as compared to other countries they might 
have experienced. Responses are shown below: 
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Graph 19: Cost of Business in Korea 
Here is one of the most polarized of all answers sets. 
The clear tendency points at a foreign investor’s 
community that finds Korea expensive to do business 
with, compared to other places where their companies 
keep operations. Note that respondents who asserted 
the environment is not expensive represent only 16% of 
the pool. 
  
25. A more interesting point, this question addresses 
the issue of profitability in Korea. Respondents 
were asked to rate either their perception based on 
facts or pure observation of the Korean domestic 
market profitability as it applies to their 
companies. Result are depicted as follows: 
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Graph 20: Korea’s Domestic Market Profitability 
The graph portrays a shape that gets closer to a bell, 
indicating that, ruling out those who omitted 
answering, most respondents tend to regard Korea as 
between average and profitable, pointing here at 
strength of Korea for FDI promotion, supporting my 
claim as mentioned before. 
 
26. In this question, I asked respondents to rate their 
experience on managing Korean staff in what 
concerns cultural and communication barriers, 
business practices and corporate culture and the 
likes. Results are shown in the graph below: 
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Graph 21: Managing Korean Staff 
The graph slightly different from the previous one 
points at a pool with mixed answers over the issue. 
While 30% of respondents don’t find the issue relevant 
to them (perhaps they are not in direct command of 
Korean staff in significant numbers), the rest remains 
divided over the issue, with slightly more pointing at 
difficulties.  
 
Among those who answered positively, I would 
hypothesize that managers that have lived in Korea 
over 5 or 10 years  (representing 45% of our pool) have 
to a good extent mastered the ability to co work and 
lead their Korean colleagues and direct reports. At 
this stage of sojourn, you also find a good number of 
foreigners with a command of the Korean language 
allowing them to communicate daily issues, and usually 
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co-working with people whose level of English is 
better than average. 
 
5.5 Lifestyle for Foreigners Living in Korea 
 
27. In the first question of this last section, I aimed 
at understanding how important was to the 
respondent to be able to communicate and socialize 
with strangers in Korea. I asked to consider 
cultural issues, language and overall perception of 
the society. Results are shown below: 
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Graph 22: How Koreans are Perceived 
Results were interesting, with an entire 30% of the 
pool indicating they were not particularly pleased 
with socio-cultural life and communication with 
strangers, while another 30% indicated to feel 
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comfortable and at ease. It seems the impression of 
dealing with Koreans on the social aspect is a 
generally a positive one. I would ad to this that the 
younger Korean generation being more “English-able” 
and more traveled than their predecessors might have 
contributed to a more friendly and welcoming Korea for 
expats, results indicate.  
 
28. What do you think of the leisure industry as it 
caters to foreigners? Is how I framed my next 
question aimed at understanding if respondents 
spend their free time at ease and in a similar was 
as they do so back in their home countries. 
Responses are shown below: 
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Graph 23: Leisure for Foreigners 
The results represent yet another polarized answer, 
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with few respondents challenging the mean at high 
scores. A good 60% of our respondents believe that 
Korea lacks facilities and amenities that cater to the 
non-Korean customer.  
 
Slightly over 20% challenge that view, yet only 2 
respondents believe facilities are excellent. This 
answer might point at an FDI inducement structure the 
government might need to address more proactively, 
that is, the leisure industry and facilities that 
cater to foreigners.  
 
Also worth mentioning is that only 2 respondents found 
the question irrelevant, meaning that most foreigners 
might place a high level of importance on how they 
spend their free time in Korea. 
 
29. The last question of my survey asked respondents to 
rate Korea in terms of living conditions, and 
indicate whether pollution, daily hassles, 
transportation, cost of living and those aspects 
that affect our personal life are of importance to 
them. They answered as follows: 
 
 53 
Daily  Hassels of Liv ing in Korea
3
1
17
2
7
10
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 1 2 3 4 5
Easy to Difficult
Re
sp
on
de
nt
s
Re
sp
on
de
nt
s
Re
sp
on
de
nt
s
Re
sp
on
de
nt
s Arithmetic Mean
(Average) = 2.39
 
Graph 24: Hassles of Korean Life 
A sharp bell rising at the score of 2 and lower value 
responses indicate that at least a good 60% of 
respondents find Korea a difficult place to live in.  
 
Again only 2 respondents find the issue irrelevant 
pointing to yet another factor that might help FDI 
promotion in Korea, that is, to understand how 
important such daily living conditions affect 
foreigners’ perception of Korea and their ability to 
live and carry out business. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
 
The 31 companies that participated in this study 
represent the opinions of a larger crowd of foreign 
investors and business people in Korea to some extent.  
 
Among the participants there were Fortune 500 companies 
representing the very large kind, middle sized and small 
corporations with few individuals in them. Although in 
Korea there are officially about 15,000 registered 
companies that have been incorporated with foreign 
capital, only a small percentage of them are headed by 
foreigners.  
 
Answers to the demographic and reinvestment intention 
sections reveal that although nearly 80% of companies 
responding to the survey have reinvested into Korea at 
least once in the past, some 60% of them are willing to 
invest again.  
 
This is corroborated by the fact that when the respondent 
is free to be the sole decision maker for the purpose of 
this survey, they do not differ much in their answers, 
still some 58% would reinvest.  
 
In order to put a numeric value to these variables and 
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understand the relationship, numbers were assigned 
according to the scale implemented across the whole 
survey in a consistent manner.  
 
For both questions numbered 12 and 14 in the previous 
section, which refer to whether a company had plans to 
reinvest and whether the individual responding would 
reinvest in Korea if it were entirely up to him/her to 
decide so, respectively, numbers “5” were assigned to 
positive answers, which correlates to all other numeric 
answers as positive impressions of Korea.  
 
Number “3” was assigned to all confidential or “I am not 
sure” answers, since these provide no value and assigned 
“1” to all negatives, for those answering they were sure 
wouldn’t invest.  
 
The covariance between the two data sets of Company Vs. 
Individual opinion was calculated, in order to identify 
how much each respondent differed in his personal opinion 
and that (s)he expressed for his/her company. The 
covariance was found at 0.73, meaning that to that extent 
most people and their firms headed in the same opinion of 
whether to reinvest or not (in this case to reinvest, as 
most answers were positive about reinvesting).  
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Note this doesn’t mean 73% of respondents had identical 
answers for both questions, it refers to what degree 
their two answers agreed (how close these were and if in 
the same direction, which is proven by a positive 
covariance), then average such answers with the rest of 
the pool.  
 
With a covariance so near a value of 1, it is concluded 
that most people did not answer significantly differently 
to both these questions. 
 
All numeric answers in the whole pool of respondents were 
gathered to calculate a mean of 2.41, which in a way is a 
very general picture of the overall impression of Korea 
these 31 individuals had. This value, slightly lower from 
indifference-“3” points at an overall negative yet no so 
strongly detrimental image of the environment that 
affects foreigner’s lives and businesses.  
 
The standard deviation found for the whole pool from this 
arithmetic average just mentioned was of 1.36, which 
means most answers across most respondents varied from 
the mean to a very small extent, indicating lots of 
consistency among and across individuals. 
 
In order to get closer to making a conclusion on whether 
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my hypothesis holds true to what extent is accurate, two 
more calculations were computed.  
 
A correlation between all answers of whether the 
individual would invest if given the absolute option of 
doing so and the arithmetic average of all his/her 
numeric answers as a data set yielded a value of 0.35, 
which in statistical significance carries a medium 
strength, and since it is positive, it indicates that to 
that extent individual answers on whether to invest or 
not are backed up by all other individual answers on the 
concepts measured, as a pool.  
 
A covariance of 0.28 indicated that among individuals, 
each positive answer to invest deviated from all other 
answers to all measures for the same individual, but not 
to a very strong extent.    
 
Summary of Values 
Measur e Val ue St r engt h 
Percentage of individuals willing 
To reinvest if given the choice  
58% Medium 
Covariance between Individual & Company 
willingness to reinvest. Value represents 
Strong tendency for answers to head in same way 
0.73 High 
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Mean of all answers by all respondents. “Big picture” 
Of Korea’s business environment based on 1 (bad) to 5 
(excellent) 
2.41 Medium-
Low 
Standard deviation of all entries from above mean. 
Indicates consistency across and among individual answers.  
1.36 Low 
Correlation between individual willingness to reinvest and 
all other answers by same individual 
0.35 Medium 
Covariance for individual willingness to reinvest and to what 
extent and in what direction (s)he differs from his/her own 
mean for all other answers 
0.28 Medium 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The study has not necessarily failed to prove the 
hypothesis, but rather found a trend with a medium 
strength (statistically speaking) showing that Korea’s 
business environment does affect intentions to reinvest, 
but that even when rating Korea lower than average on all 
measures exposed, there is still a general positive 
attitude to reinvestment, although not significantly high. 
 
This claim is corroborated by a near 60% of individual 
respondents willing to reinvest, and the standard 
deviation from the mean of scores on this measure a low 
one (indicating consistency among surveyed volunteers. 
 
There is no question that many foreign business people 
find Korea a difficult place to live, let alone to enjoy 
leisure in a westernized way. Graphs 23 and 24 show 
strong evidence of this claim. It would definitely be 
interesting to have accumulated a much larger sample to 
look at this particular score again in more detail, as it 
may indicate an area where the government can attempt to 
make improvements.  
 
Similarly, graphs 14 on a comparison of Korean and banks 
in other countries and 19 on the cost of doing business 
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in Korea also point at areas of needed improvement.  
 
The former indicates that Korean banks might indeed 
benefit from foreign expertise on management, a claim 
that is supported by numerous takeovers by foreign banks 
of Korean financial institutions on an ailing status, 
from as far back as 1997’s crisis to nowadays most recent 
purchased of Korea First Bank by Standard Chartered.   
 
The remaining questions showed tendencies on both the 
positive and negative sides of the scale. Perhaps the 
best approach at understanding where the trends lie would 
be to continue the study and gather a much more 
representative sample of foreign investors.  
 
Summarizing the most salient characteristics of Korea’s 
current FDI promotion strategy, the following SWOT 
analysis suggests the Korean government areas of 
potential improvement that go inline with the findings of 
my study. 
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Opportunities
Weaknesses
Exceptionally inconsistent government 
agencies
Intrinsic/unnecessary regulations, 
Weak promotion tag lines
Inward oriented, aspiration-based 
promotion strategy
Lack of facilities for foreigners
Strengths
Threats 
SWOT OF KOREA AND IT’S FDI PROMOTION STRATEGY
Unparalleled economic recovery 
capability
Fast and reliable 
construction/development capability
Energetic society, strong and 
capable of great feats, 
entrepreneurial
Neighboring successful FDI-inducing  
cities might provide synergy
Economic ability of government allows to 
cooperate with private sector for 
promoting
Right leadership can align all IPA’s united 
in purpose with targets and attainable 
goals
Neighboring FDI-inducement giants are far 
ahead
Labor and organized activism can damage 
country’s image
Disorganized/unfocused incentives regalia 
to put FDI promotion account in red
 
 
The reader will notice that in the section on 
“weaknesses” the information displayed is backed by the 
results of the survey, graphs 23 and 24 are the basis of 
this claim. Moreover, readying back to the FDI calendar 
of events found on chapter 3, one can find more evidence 
of government inconsistency and its inability to rally 
the Korean society to understand the benefits of FDI. 
 
One of the strongest conclusions to make is that 
leadership is needed to align all IPAs of Korea united in 
one purpose to increase efficiency and maximize 
consistency for investors across the country. 
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페이지 16: [1] 삭제됨 관리자 2006-07-02 AM 12:35:00 
Here I quote newly appointed head of Invest Korea, the 
nation’s official IPA Dr. Tong Soo Chung, on the topic of 
human resources competency, in his speech delivered at the 
Korea Development Institute School on April 15th, 2006 as 
saying “…how do we assume we are smarter than say Indians 
or Chinese or Japanese, or more academically prepared? 
India has 300 million university grads, the great majority 
of whom speak much better English than many in Korea, as 
long as we keep assuming we are a better prepared force 
than any of our neighbors we keep loosing competitive 
ground to a highly prepared work force that is ready to hit 
the international markets at much lower wages than 
Koreans...” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
페이지 16: [2] 삭제됨 관리자 2006-07-02 AM 12:40:00 
, both these groups of characteristics do not need to match 
 
페이지 17: [3] 삭제됨 관리자 2006-07-02 AM 12:43:00 
More on the hub idea, despite the budget dedicated to 
this and efforts targeting FDI inducement, the only 
hub that has emerged strong is the one of 
inconsistency. With an overwhelming plethora of laws, 
rules, regulations, and implicit barriers to FDI,  
Korea wastes tons of resources on promoting 
impossible to achieve endeavors. Internal 
inconsistencies make this hub plan unattainable.  
I would also argue that a 
 
페이지 17: [4] 서식 있음 관리자 2006-07-02 AM 12:46:00 
번호 매기기 + 수준:1 + 번호 스타일: 1, 2, 3, … + 시작 번호: 1 + 
맞춤: 왼쪽 + 맞춤 위치: 0.71 cm + 탭 간격:  1.63 cm + 들여쓰기 위
치: 1.63 cm 
 
페이지 17: [5] 삭제됨 관리자 2006-07-02 AM 12:45:00 
 behind in this part-state part-private model for 
investment promotion resulting in FDI confidence.  
 
 
